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The Ethiops say that their gods are flat-nosed and black, 
While the Thracians say that theirs have blue eyes and red hair. 
Yet if cattle or horses or lions had hands and could draw, 
And could sculpt like men, then the horses would draw their gods 
Like horses, and cattle like cattle; and each they would shape 
Bodies of gods in the likeness, each kind, of their own. 
–Xenophanes
1. Introduction
What explains cognition and perception? What explains how the world looks to us, why we are 
subject to systematic illusions? What explains our capacity to speak and to understand language? 
The ultimate infrastructure for personal level cognition and perception lies in the physical 
construction of our bodies. But description at the level of fundamental physics doesn’t promise 
much insight into the mechanisms of cognition and perception. We want rational insight, so to 
speak, into the infrastructure of cognitive achievement. We are tempted to seek an explanation 
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not in terms of a family of concepts disjoint from those under which we bring the explananda but 
in terms of the same or allied concepts.   
 How does a research team solve a problem that none of its members is able to solve 
alone?  It institutes a division of labor, in which different members of the team carry out different 
portions of the task, drawing on complementary skills and knowledge.  When we have a 
specification of the division of labor, the subtasks and the processes by which they were carried 
out, and the organization of the team members that explains how their several contributions are 
combined into a complete solution, we understand the mechanism by which the research team 
solved the problem.  This gives us rational insight into its cognitive achievement.  This gives us 
one model for how to understand personal level cognitive achievement, namely, in terms of a 
division of labor into subtasks conceived of as problems to be solved at the subpersonal level.  It 
promises rational insight into cognitive achievement, provided that the operation of these 
subpersonal processes can be characterized in terms of the same concepts as personal level 
cognitive operations, that is, in terms of rational problem solving or inferential reasoning, of 
some form or other.  Since these processes are to explain personal level cognitive achievement, 
they are conceived of as being strictly subpersonal.  Insofar, they are unconscious inference 
theories of personal level cognitive achievement. 
 This chapter considers the allure and prospects for unconscious inference theories of 
cognitive achievement (henceforth, ‘UIT’). UITs explain various conscious, perceptual, and 
cognitive phenomena by postulating inference-like processes that operate over unconscious 
representational states. They subdivide into positions that hold (a) that these unconscious 
representational states and inference-like processes are in principle accessible to consciousness, 
and therefore are personal level states and processes, and (b) that they are strictly subpersonal 
and in principle inaccessible to consciousness (access or phenomenal (Block, 1995, 2002)). Our 
  3 
interest lies in the latter. UITs in category (b) subdivide into those that hold that the inference-
like processes are (i) genuine inferences or (ii) not inferences but merely inference-like, 
inference facsimiles. We subdivide UITs in type (b)(ii) into those that hold inference facsimiles 
are defined over genuine representational states and those that hold they are defined over a 
theory-internal concept of representation. These divisions are represented in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
We argue that the only tenable UITs are ones that employ a theory internal technical notion of 
representation (lower right in Figure 1) but that once we give cash-value definitions of the 
relevant notions of representation and inference, it is difficult to see that much is left of the 
ordinary notion of representation. We suggest that the real value of talk of unconscious 
inferences lies in (a) their heuristic utility in helping us to make fruitful predictions, e.g., about 
illusions, and (b) their providing a high-level description of the functional organization of 
UITs
(a) States and Processes
in Principle Accessible to
Consciousness (hence,
personal level states and
processes)
(b) Subpersonal States
and Processes in
Principle Inaccessible to
Consciousness
(i) Genuine Inferential
Processes
(ii) Inference Facsimiles
Genuine
Representational
States
Theory Internal
Technical Concept of
Representation
Figure 1: Unconscious Inference Theories 
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subpersonal faculties that makes clear how they equip an agent to navigate its environment and 
pursue its goals.1  
 In §2 we characterize the kinds of unconscious inference that we are concerned with. In 
§3 we review desiderata on what kinds of processes can count as inferences. In §4 we apply the 
desiderata to argue that there are no genuine modular subpersonal inferences. First, we argue that 
if they are inferences, they require a homunculus as their subject (§4.1). Next, we argue that the 
conditions required for this are not met by subpersonal modular capacities (§4.2). Finally, we 
argue that even waiving these points, UITs face a dilemma: they are committed either to an 
explanatory regress or the explanatory dispensability of unconscious inferences. In §5 we 
consider a retreat that merely requires inference facsimiles at the subpersonal level. We look at 
input-output representations (§5.1) and structural representations (§5.2) in Ramsey’s sense 
(2007), and argue neither provide a genuine notion of representation suitable for use in a UIT. 
We then turn to cash-value definitions that make no pretense to connect with ordinary notions 
and suggest that they do not add new explanatory power, though talk of representations and 
inferences can play a useful heuristic role in theorizing about cognition and perception (§5.3). §6 
summarizes. 
2. Subpersonal Modular Inferences 
Typically unconscious subpersonal inferences are treated as taking place in modular systems that 
serve narrowly defined functions. UITs of perceptual achievement (veridical representation of 
the environment) and linguistic understanding are paradigm examples. Although most of our 
discussion focuses on perception, the points carry over to other theories that treat information 
processing subsystems as inferential.2  
While UITs of perceptual achievement have an ancient pedigree (Hatfield, 2002), 
contemporary theories trace their lineage back to Helmholtz (1867). Classic examples include 
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(Barlow, 1990; Brunswik, 1981; J. A. Fodor, 1983; R. L. Gregory, 1966; Richard L. Gregory, 
1980, 1997; Irvin Rock, 1983; Irving Rock, 1984; Wandell, 1995). As Helmholtz puts it, the 
inferences that the perceptual system engage in  
 
… are in general not conscious, but rather unconscious. In their outcomes they are like 
inferences insofar as we from the observed effect on our senses arrive at an idea of the 
cause of this effect. This is so even though we always in fact only have direct access to 
events at the nerves, that is, we sense the effects, never the external objects. (1867, p. 
430) 
 
Similarly, according to Rock: 
 
Although perception is autonomous with respect to such higher mental faculties as are 
exhibited in conscious thought and in the use of conscious knowledge, I would still argue 
that it is intelligent. By calling perception “intelligent,” I mean to say that it is based on 
such thought like mental processes as description, inference, and problem solving, 
although these processes are rapid-fire, unconscious, and nonverbal. “Description” 
implies, for example, that a perceptual property such as shape is the result of an abstract 
analysis of an object’s geometrical configuration, including how it is oriented, in a form 
like that of a proposition, except that it is not couched in language. Such a description of 
a square, for example, might be “a figure with opposite sides equal and parallel and four 
right angles, the sides being horizontal and vertical in space.” “Inference” implies that 
certain perceptual properties are computed from given sensory information using 
unconsciously known rules. For example, perceived size is inferred from the object’s 
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visual angle, its perceived distance, and the law that geometrical optics relating the visual 
angle to object distance. “Problem solving” implies a more creative process of arriving at 
a hypothesis concerning what object or event in the world the stimulus might represent 
and then determining whether the hypothesis accounts adequately for, and is supported 
adequately by, the stimulus. (1984, p. p. 234) 
 
More recently, UITs have been given new life by the idea that the brain is a predictive engine, 
and, more specifically, a Bayesian reasoner, which engages in probabilistic inference about the 
hidden causes of sensory input with the goal of reducing sensory prediction errors (Clark, 2016; 
Hohwy, 2013).3 As Hohwy puts it: “The brain infers the causes of its sensory input using Bayes’ 
rule” (2013, p. p. 18).4 According to Clark, “the predictive processing story, if correct, would 
rather directly underwrite the claim that the nervous system approximates a genuine version of 
Bayesian inference” (2016, p. p. 41). Rescorla notes that the inferences involved are strictly 
subpersonal:  
 
Perceptual processes are subpersonal and inaccessible to the thinker. There is no good 
sense in which the thinker herself, as opposed to her perceptual system, executes 
perceptual inferences. For instance, a normal perceiver simply sees a surface as having a 
certain colour. Even if she notices the light spectrum reaching her eye, as a painter might, 
she cannot access the perceptual system’s inference from retinal stimulations to surface 
colour. (2015, p. p. 695) 
 
At the level of our discussion, differences between classical and Bayesian inference theories will 
not be significant. The problem lies in the transference of concepts (i.e., the concepts of 
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inference and representation) from one domain to another without taking seriously the conditions 
for their application. Details with respect to the nature and content of the postulated inferences 
make no difference.  
 Let’s look at how a UIT might explain perceptual constancy. Perceptual constancies are 
described by a function that yields a constant value (perceptual representation) while its 
arguments (sensory stimuli) change. When the value is constant while inputs change, we have 
the representation of sameness of size, shape, color, etc. through changes of proximal stimulus. 
The UIT strategy is to explain how the perceptual system achieves constant representation of the 
relevant property by giving it knowledge of the function and knowledge of the appropriate 
arguments. For example, Emmert’s Law states that the perceived linear size of an object is 
proportional to the product of its perceived distance and the angle subtended on the retina. There 
are analogues for constancy of represented shape through rotation relative to the observer, 
constancy of lightness and color through variations in illumination conditions, constancy of 
position relative to movement of the perceiver, and so on. The perceptual system gets 
information about, e.g., perceived distance (inferred from more basic cues) and the angle 
subtended by an object in the visual field and 
then infers using Emmert’s Law a size which is 
to be represented in perceptual experience. 
Inferential mechanisms are also used to explain 
illusions. For example, in the Ponzo illusion 
illustrated in Figure 2, the black bars are the 
same length but the depth cues provided by the 
receding track generate a visual representation 
of the upper bar as longer than the lower.  Figure 2: Ponzo Illusion 
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For our purposes, the key features of the supposed inferential processes involved in UITs are 
that: (1) they operate over representations that bear semantic relations to one another;  (2) they are modular in that they are relatively autonomous from personal level cognition, 
intention, belief, and reasoning; (3) they are postulated to explain specific perceptual and cognitive capacities; (4) their inputs are paradigmatically not personal level cognitive states but subpersonal 
representations, so that they are not conceived of simply as mediating personal level 
cognitive states as input and conscious output, and (5) they are not in principle accessible to the person whose cognitive and perceptual 
capacities they subserve, because their functional role is to precede and to explain 
modifications of consciousness. 
3. What are inferences? In	this	section	we	review	the	central	desiderata	on	an	account	of	personal	level	inference	(PLI).	We	identify	features	generally	accepted	as	necessary	for	inference.	This	sets	the	stage	for	asking	whether	subpersonal	modular	processes	subserving	personal	level	cognition	are	plausibly	thought	of	as	inferential.		
3. 1 Conditions on a successful account of PLI PLI	involves	a	transition	from	one	set	of	propositional	attitudes	(e.g.,	beliefs,	intentions,	suppositions)	to	another.	Inferences	can	terminate	in	a	new	attitude—a	new	intention	in	
  9 
practical	inference	or	belief	in	theoretical	inference.	Alternatively,	they	can	terminate	in	an	alteration	of	current	attitudes—for	example,	an	inference	may	result	in	relinquishing	an	intention	or	strengthening	a	belief.	Attitudes	whose	contents	support	the	attitudinal	shift	are	premise	attitudes,	the	new	or	altered	attitudes	that	result	are	conclusion	attitudes.		Practical	and	theoretical	inferences	are	distinguished	by	the	attitude	types	of	their	premise	and	conclusion	states.	For	theoretical	inference,	the	premise	and	conclusion	attitudes	have	mind-to-world	direction	of	fit.	For	practical	inference,	two	kinds	of	attitudes	are	required,	those	with	mind-to-world	direction	of	fit	(beliefs)	and	those	with	world-to-mind	direction	of	fit	(preferences).	In	practical	inference,	means-end	beliefs	provide	premises,	while	preferences	provide	comparative	evaluative	judgments,	such	as	that	vanilla	ice	cream	is	better	than	chocolate.		An	inference	must	involve	states	that	have	modes	appropriate	for	its	type.	For	example,	a	sequence	of	wishes	whose	contents	are	related	by	a	logically	valid	argument	form	is	not	an	inference,	despite	logical	relations	between	their	contents.	We	focus	on	theoretical	rather	than	practical	reasoning,	in	which	transitions	occur	between	states	with	mind-to-world	direction	of	fit.	This	excludes	treating	modeless	representations	as	figuring	in	inferential	processes.		It	is	widely	accepted	that	a	successful	account	of	PLI	must	satisfy	the	following	three	desiderata	(P.	Boghossian,	2014;	Broome,	2013,	2014):5		 (1) It	must	distinguish	PLI	from	other	types	of	transition	in	thought.		
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Not	just	any	transition	between	propositional	attitudes	(even	of	the	correct	types)	constitutes	an	inference.	For	example,	an	associative	shift	between	two	attitudes	is	not	an	inference.	A	change	in	attitudes	must	be	caused	‘in	the	right	way’	to	constitute	inference.	Therefore,	the	fact	that	the	attitude	contents	have	logical	relations	between	them	suitable	for	epistemic	support	is	not	sufficient	for	a	mental	transition	to	constitute	an	inference. For	example,	although	A	follows	from	A	and	B,	one	might	come	to	believe	A	from	believing	A	
and	B	by	associating	A	with	B	rather	than	inferring	it	from	A	and	B.	 	 (2) It	must	allow	that	one	can	make	a	mistaken	or	non-normative	inference,	that	is,	one	which	still	counts	as	an	inference	despite	its	not	being	a	good	inference.			Roughly,	a	mistaken	inference	is	one	in	which	the	premise	attitudes	provide	little	or	no	support	for	the	conclusion	attitudes.	People	do	not	always	reason	correctly.	An	adequate	analysis	of	PLI	must	allow	that	individuals	can	make	inferences	even	when	they	commit	the	base-rate	fallacy	or	affirm	the	consequent.	So	the	fact	that	someone’s	attitude	transitions	do	not	conform	to	Bayesian	norms	on	belief	updating	(e.g.,	conditionalization)	does	not	entail	that	the	person	has	failed	to	infer.	Putting	this	together	with	(1),	descriptively	conforming	to,	e.g.,	Bayesian	norms	in	attitude	transitions	is	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	for	engaging	in	inference.		 (3) It	must	explain	how	PLI	is	something	we	do	and	not	merely	something	that	happens	to	or	within	us.		
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We	make	inferences	and	we	update	our	attitudes	in	doing	so.	An	adequate	account	of	PLI	must	allow	for	inference	to	be	a	controlled	process	as	opposed	to	something	that	merely	happens	to	a	person.		Much	of	the	contemporary	literature	on	PLI	focuses	on	what	Paul	Boghossian	(2014)	calls	the	Taking	Condition	(TC):		 [TC]	Inferring	necessarily	involves	the	thinker	taking	her	premises	to	support	her	conclusion	and	drawing	the	conclusion	because	of	that	fact.	6			TC	is	regarded	by	many	as	central	to	satisfying	conditions	(1)-(3).	TC	distinguishes	inference	from	other	thought	transitions	by	requiring	that	inference	involves	the	reasoner	
taking	her	premises	to	support	her	conclusion	and	drawing	the	conclusion	in	virtue	of	this	(desideratum	1).	An	associative	transition	does	not	depend	on	one’s	taking	there	to	be	an	epistemic	support	relation	between	one’s	premises	and	conclusion.	Furthermore,	TC	makes	room	for	incorrectly	taking	one’s	premises	to	support	one’s	conclusion.	In	consequence,	one	can	count	as	inferring	a	conclusion	even	when	it	is	not	supported	by	one’s	premises	(desideratum	2).	Finally,	because	TC	implies	that	a	transition	in	thought	only	constitutes	an	inference	when	it	is	responsive	to	its	subject	taking	the	premises	to	support	the	conclusion,	inference	is	properly	something	that	can	be	attributed	to	the	subject,	rather	than	something	that	merely	happens	to	or	within	her	(desideratum	3).			 TC	requires	clarification.	A	full	account	would	need	to	explain:		
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(1) What	taking	one’s	premises	to	support	one’s	conclusion	consist	in,	e.g.,	whether	taking	is	an	intentional	state	like	belief	or	intuition,	or	whether	it	is	something	like	a	disposition	to	judge	that	one’s	premises	support	one’s	conclusion,7	(2) What	the	content	of	the	taking	is,8		(3) What	it	is	to	draw	one’s	conclusion	in	virtue	of	taking	one’s	premises	to	support	it,	that	is,	what	is	required	beyond	the	premise	attitudes	causing	the	conclusion	attitudes.		Most	contemporary	work	on	inference	either	(i)	focuses	on	answering	one	(or	more)	of	the	above	questions	or	(ii)	challenges	TC	as	a	necessary	condition	of	inference.	However,	extant	objections	to	TC	assume	that	taking	constitutes	an	intentional	or	representational	state	(McHugh	&	Way,	2016;	Rosa,	2017;	Wright,	2014).	Thus,	these	are	not	objections	to	TC	per	se	but	to	a	certain	way	of	explaining	it.		The	dominant	account	treats	inference	as	a	causal	process	that	constitutes	rule-following.	For	example,	Boghossian	(2014)	adopts	a	rule-following	account	in	which	inferring	just	is	following	a	rule	of	inference	in	moving	from	a	set	of	premise	attitudes	to	a	conclusion	attitude.	Roughly,	we	can	think	of	a	rule	as	an	instance	of	the	following	schema:			 If	antecedent	conditions,	C,	hold,	then	it	is	permitted/required	to	do/accept/believe	A.9			In	a	rule-governed	theoretical	inference	the	antecedent	conditions	will	be	the	possession	of	certain	premise	attitudes,	and	the	rule	will	indicate	which	attitude(s)	one	is	then	
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permitted/required	to	adopt.	Boghossian	argues	that	in	following	a	rule	(rather	than	merely	conforming	to	it)	one	takes	the	antecedent	conditions	as	reason	to	perform	the	permitted/required	action.	So,	if	a	person	follows	a	rule	of	inference,	nothing	additional	is	needed	for	her	to	take	her	premises	to	support	her	conclusion.	The	taking	falls	out	from	the	rule-following;	no	additional	occurrent,	intentional	state	constitutes	the	taking.		We	treat	TC	as	a	fourth	requirement	on	an	adequate	account	of	PLI,	aimed	in	part	at	satisfying	requirements	(1)-(3).	It	expresses	a	relation	of	the	reasoner	to	a	process	involving	intentional	states	that	makes	sense	of	its	being	normatively	appropriate	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	reasoner.	We	formulate	this	as	follows:		 TC*:	For	a	transition	between	premise	states	to	conclusion	states	to	count	as	an	inference,	their	subject	must	take	the	premises	to	support	the	conclusion,	whether	this	is	a	matter	of	an	explicit	intentional	attitude	with	that	content,	the	process	being	explained	by	the	subject	following	a	rule	appropriate	for	the	type	of	inference,	or	the	subject	being	disposed	to	regard	or	act	as	if	the	inference	is	correct	or	justified.		We	are	deliberately	non-specific	to	allow	for	various	ways	theorists	have	tried	to	make	TC	more	precise.	Notice	that	even	if	inference	is	construed	as	a	matter	of	following	a	rule,	when	that	is	not	understood	in	terms	of	a	propositional	attitude	about	the	transition,	since	the	rule	is	defined	over	the	states	involved	in	the	transition,	it	requires	the	agent	to	be	sensitive	in	its	cognitive	operations	to	the	contents	of	those	states.		
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4. Are there modular subpersonal inferential processes? 
By subpersonal modular inferential processes (SMI) we mean processes which are genuinely 
inferential and not merely treated as if they were, or modeled by inferences (we return to ‘as-if’ 
talk in §5). We focus on the claim that there are modular processes involved in vision, language 
understanding, and other cognitive processes that (i) operate over states with intentional content 
and subserve personal level cognitive and perceptual processes by delivering appropriate 
personal level intentional states and (ii) constitute inferences on the part of the modular system 
itself as opposed to the personal level subject (PLS).10  
In this section, we develop an argument against the plausibility and theoretical utility of 
SMI processes, construed as above.  
 (1) First, we argue that if inferential, SMI must be treated as inferences of a cognitive agent 
with propositional attitudes.  (2) Second, we argue that the conditions required to attribute SMI to subpersonal units 
conceived of as cognitive agents are not met.  (3) Third, we argue that even if conditions required to attribute SMI to subpersonal units 
were met, this would amount to a homuncular explanation of personal level cognitive 
achievement, and that, to avoid a regress, the explanation of the cognitive capacities of 
the homunculi would have to be given in different terms. Then the same style of 
explanation could be applied for personal level cognitive achievement, showing the 
homuncular explanation to be gratuitous. The explanation offered is therefore defective 
because it is in principle replaceable and there is no non-question-begging reason not to 
replace it at the first stage of explanation.  
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4.2 Modular Inferences Require Homunculi 
If SMI are genuine inferences but not by the PLS, they must be inferences of a subpersonal level 
agent. We will say a homunculus is a subpersonal agent whose cognitive work subserves 
personal level cognitive achievements. Thus, if SMI are genuine inferences, they require 
homunculi. 
First, for SMI to be genuine inferences, we must be able to make sense of their being 
taken to be correct by their subject. This requires us to conceive of their subject as taking 
intentional attitudes toward the inferences or at least to be disposed to take such attitudes toward 
them, or to be involved in rule-following of the sort that would support the idea that the subject 
takes a normative stance toward the relevant transitions. This is what it is for a cognitive agent to 
be making inferences. If the subject of SMI is not the PLS, it must be a homunculus.  
Second, inferences involve transitions among propositional attitudes. Propositional 
attitudes have agents as their subjects. Moreover, SMI are theoretical inferences. Therefore, they 
require attitudes with mind-to-world direction of fit, that is, belief-like states.11 The functional 
role of belief is to guide behavior, broadly construed, in the light of system goals. We can get a 
grip on states having mind-to-world direction of fit only if we are prepared to attribute to the 
system goals as well, and at least some form of rudimentary agency, in which its activities are 
directed in accordance with its beliefs and preferences. These are not personal level 
psychological states. They are not part of the psychological economy of the PLS. They therefore 
require a subpersonal agent.12 
Third, the attribution of attitudes with contents presupposes that the concepts involved in 
the attitudes are possessed by their subject. Concept possession requires having the capacity to 
deploy concepts appropriately in relation to evidence and to reason in accordance with the 
requirements of their application conditions. Since these concepts are not and need not be 
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possessed by the PLS in virtue of having the relevant modular capacity, as the case of children 
and non-human animals show, they are not concepts of the PLS—even if the PLS has the 
concepts independently. There must therefore be a distinct cognitive agent who possesses them.13  
4.3 SMI are not Homuncular Inferences 
The main argument against homuncular SMI is that attributions of inferential capacities require 
commitments that are not met by subpersonal processes subserving personal level cognition and 
perception.14 We raise two problems, the holism of attitude attribution, and the holism of concept 
attribution.  
First, inferences are not defined over representations but over attitudes with 
psychological modes appropriate for the forms of inference. In the case of theoretical inferences 
(about how things are) this requires a mode with mind-to-world direction of fit. But attitudes 
with mind-to-world direction of fit are part of a pattern that includes attitudes with world-to-
mind direction of fit.  
The reason that attribution of belief takes place in the context of attribution of desire and 
intention is that the canonical role of belief is to guide action in the light of preference. This is 
what gives us the idea that a state is a state whose job it is to represent something in the world as 
opposed to one that is merely lawfully correlated, like tree rings, with changes in the world. The 
difficulty with homunculi engaging in SMI is that there is no point in attributing to them any 
preferences or intentions, any more than there is to attributing preferences and intentions to trees. 
Trees do not engage in flexible goal directed behavior guided by representations of their 
environment. Neither do subpersonal cognitive faculties. We might attribute to a subpersonal 
module a function, relative to its contribution to cognition, but this is not to attribute a goal to the 
module itself. There is no more point to attributing goals to subpersonal modules that have 
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functions subserving cognition and perception than to the heart or lungs or small intestines, all of 
which have biological functions as well.15  
The second problem is connected. There are holistic constraints also on the attribution of 
concepts. The inferences typically attributed to modular faculties require sophisticated 
conceptual resources and reasoning capacities which there is no evidence that subpersonal 
modules possess, as opposed to those theorizing about them. This is one reason we do not want 
to attribute these inferences to PLS. The operations of subpersonal mechanisms subserving 
cognition are insensitive to whether the PLS possesses the competencies required by the 
concepts deployed in SMI. But then it is even less plausible to attribute these competencies to 
subpersonal agents that do not have the capacity to deploy these or even simpler concepts. Even 
as simple an inference as that involved in deploying Emmert’s Law for linear size constancy 
requires geometrical concepts of angle, distance, size, and space, as well as the concept of 
equivalence and mathematical product—and this is just a beginning.16  
Concept possession is constituted by competence in correct application. Vision theorists 
and linguists have these concepts because they can deploy them across different domains.  Their 
attribution to theorists is supported by attribution of a range of supporting concepts, for vision 
theorists, of number, sum, cardinality, color, light, etc., and for linguists, of language, meaning, 
compositionality, rule, scope, domain, binding, etc. None of these general capacities can be 
attributed to subpersonal modules. The concepts attributed are only postulated to be deployed in 
a limited domain. No one thinks that the competencies required for possession of these concepts 
by the theorists who deploy them in describing SMI are possessed by subpersonal modules. But 
since the competencies are required to possess the concepts, the modules themselves do not 
possess the concepts. Therefore, they are not capable of performing inferences over contents 
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involving them, since having the attitudes involved in the inference requires having the concepts 
they involve.  
The attribution of SMI to subpersonal modules is a form of theoretical projection. If a 
vision scientist were to explain to someone how one might extract the relevant information 
present in, e.g., visual representation of the environment, from physical stimuli, given 
background knowledge of how the world works, she might use the sort of inferential account 
attributed to the visual system itself. Seeing the visual system as doing what the vision scientist 
is doing is supposed to make intelligible how the visual system does it: it does it just like that, 
like a vision scientist with tunnel vision, who cannot make any other inferences, who cannot 
think about anything in general, who cannot deploy the relevant concepts in any other domain. 
But the light at the end of the tunnel goes out when we see that having the concepts cannot be 
divorced from the general capacities that constitute competence in their deployment.  
4.4 Explanatory Regress or Explanatory Dispensability 
If we could find a subject for SMI, would we have an explanation of our cognitive 
achievements? The short answer is: Yes. But if we explain how cognition is possible in one 
agent by appeal to others engaging in cognition on its behalf, we have not explained how 
cognition as such is possible. It might be said that we can do better than this because we can 
explain the cognitive achievements of the subpersonal modules as well. But how? One might 
reapply the strategy of breaking the task down into subtasks performed by a second, deeper level 
of cognitive agents. Would this explain adequately the cognitive achievements of the first level 
of subpersonal cognitive agents? Yes … but only by postponing again the question of how 
cognition as such is possible. 
 One reply is homuncular functionalism (D. C. Dennett, 1978, p. p. 80): as we go down 
levels, we make an explanatory advance because the homunculi get successively dumber as they 
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are given successively simpler inferences to make. 17 Yet even agents who are not very clever, if 
they are making even simple inferences, have to meet the holistic constraints on attitude and 
concept possession. Moreover, one needs to specify, at each level, exactly what the inferences 
are. It is unlikely that their content becomes less sophisticated as we go down the hierarchy, as 
they involve the concepts that theorists use to describe input and output. Consequently, simple 
inferences or not, we are postulating sophisticated cognitive agents.  
 One might reply that SMI were never intended to explain cognition as such. One could 
accept the force of the regress argument but still maintain that some explanatory progress has 
been made. This comes with a commitment to explain the subpersonal level cognition without 
adverting to further levels of subpersonal inferential processing. But now there is a dilemma. 
Suppose that putative SMI can be explained without appeal to further underlying subsubpersonal 
level inferences. We would then have an explanation of how cognition works which does not 
ultimately require appeal to cognitive operations. Why can’t we apply this strategy at the first 
sublevel of processing? If we can, then the postulation of SMI is gratuitous because it is 
explanatorily dispensable. The only support that can be provided for it, since it is by hypothesis 
inaccessible to the PLS, is that if it were true, it would partially explain personal level cognition. 
Thus, if SMI are not explanatorily dispensable, they set us off on an explanatory regress. If they 
set us off on an explanatory regress, then they cannot provide an explanation of cognition as 
such. If the regress can be stopped, then SMI are explanatorily dispensable. Thus, SMI are either 
explanatorily dispensable or we cannot provide an explanation for cognition as such.  
5. Inference facsimiles 
Surely it is a mistake to suppose the sorts of inferences appealed to in UITs are intended to be 
inferences in the ordinary sense! Similarly, surely the representations over which unconscious 
inferences are defined were never intended to be ordinary representations. Thus, we do not need 
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a subject of the inference who takes their premises to be support for their conclusions, and we do 
not need to worry about holistic constraints on attitude attribution or concept possession. From 
the standpoint of the working scientist, these criticisms are an example par excellence of the 
attempt to constrain the development of concepts appropriate for theoretical explanation to those 
developed in the domain of commonsense, which would frustrate the search for theoretical 
explanations across every domain in which science operates. 
 It is doubtful that all theorists who invoke unconscious inferences to explain cognitive 
achievements think of them as different from ordinary inferences in any respect other than being 
in principle unconscious and subserving personal level cognition and perception.18 But a natural 
fallback is to suggest that the notions of inference and representation deployed in UITs should be 
understood in a different sense than the vernacular. On this view, to talk of “unconscious 
inferences” in the context of a UIT is not to talk about unconscious inferences, but about, as we 
will put it, unconscious inference facsimiles, like, in some respects, but not the same as, 
inferences. This leaves us with two questions. First, what is the content of such UITs, given their 
reliance on unconscious inference facsimiles, since we cannot rely on our antecedent 
understanding of ‘inference’ and ‘content’? Second, in what does their theoretical utility lie: how 
are they to help us understand cognition and perception?  
 There is a hard and a soft line on the first question. The hard line maintains that while not 
subject to the usual holistic constraints, the states over which SMI are defined are genuine 
representations. The processes defined over them that subserve personal level cognition and 
perception are inferential insofar as the states in the processes bear semantic relations to one 
another that mimic inferential processes. Thus, the status of the processes as substantively 
inference-like depends on the states involved being genuine representations. The soft line 
relinquishes the idea that there need be anything of our antecedent notion of representation left 
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and treats talk of representations as a proxy for something that could be explained without appeal 
to intentionality. We address the hard line first, then the soft line, which leads to the second 
question.  
5.1 The Hard Line: IO-Representations 
What constraints are there on genuine representation? Ramsey (2007) notes that it is not enough 
for the theorist to assign representational content to states, as when we treat voltage levels in 
transistors as representing 1 or 0. These make sense relative to tasks we design a machine to 
implement. It doesn’t give the machine the task or intrinsic intentionality. The notions we appeal 
to, as Ramsey says, “must in some way be rooted in our ordinary conception of representation; 
otherwise, there would be little point in calling a neural or computational state a representation” 
(p. 25).  But they can’t be observer relative. We must make sense of the states having content 
and of their functioning as representations for the system containing them. Ramsey distinguishes 
two notions of representation for subpersonal cognitive processing that can be detached from 
propositional attitude psychology, input-output representation, or IO-representation (2007, sec. 
3.2), and structural representation, or S-representation (2007, sec. 3.3). We deal with IO-
representations in this section and S-representations in the next.  
IO-representation applies to a system that already has representations as inputs and as 
outputs. If intervening processing can be explained by state transitions that, by an assignment of 
content to them, represent the process as involving semantically sanctioned transitions from 
input to output, then those internal states have IO-representations. Ramsey claims that IO-
representations are genuine representations for the system, and so not merely observer relative. 
But there are two problems with this. First, there is no evident inconsistency in denying that the 
assignment of representations to internal states characterized neutrally captures something 
intrinsic to the system. For it is not inconsistent to claim that what mediates input and output is 
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simply causal-functional organization. One might stipulate that if there is a semantic mapping, 
then mediating states are IO-representations. But this is a merely verbal maneuver and so not 
ampliative. Second, even if Ramsey were correct, IO-representation can’t be applied to 
perceptual processing since it presupposes that both input and output independently have 
representational content—and although the output of perceptual systems is independently 
representational, the input is not (or not solely). Thus, this notion of representation for the 
perceptual system would rely on an observer relative assignment of representation to inputs to 
the perceptual system. This would give the intervening states IO-representational content, but 
they would be observer relative as well, and not representations for the system.  
5.2 The Hard Line: S-Representations  
S-representations are structural representations. The idea is illustrated by a map. Points on the 
map correspond to areas on the terrain (within a margin of error). The distance between points 
corresponds to the distance between the areas on the terrain. When we use a map, we exploit 
what we know about its structure and the mapping function to learn about the terrain. Put most 
generally, it is the idea of a modeling system consisting of elements (m-elements) and relations 
between them which are isomorphic to a target system with its elements (t-elements) and its 
relations in the sense that there is a mapping from m-elements to t-elements, and a mapping of 
m-relations to t-relations, such that for any m-relation, r, relating a sequence, s, of m-elements, 
the image of r in the target system relates the image of the sequence of m-elements in the target 
system. The image of a relation or element of the modeling system in the target system is what it 
is mapped onto. The idea is that subpersonal processes may extract information from models in 
this sense to guide what representations are produced at the personal level.19  
 The difficulty lies in the idea that a subpersonal process extracts information to guide a 
process. What gives substance to this idea? It is not that there is an isomorphism between 
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elements of the system and something outside it. Isomorphism is not representation. The cars in 
one row in a parking lot may be isomorphic with those in the next. But neither row represents the 
other. Isomorphism is symmetric, representation is not. When we use a map to locate a 
restaurant, we are the ones who, by exploiting what we know of its structure and relation to a 
city, use it as a representation. This presupposes an agent who uses it as a representation for a 
purpose. For subpersonal processes hypothesized to exploit S-representations, however, there is 
no one who uses them. By hypothesis the PLS does not use them. And having set aside the 
appeal to subpersonal agents as implausible, unsupported, and pointless, there is no one else to 
use them either. We are left with a structure isomorphic with some bit of reality that plays a 
causal role in the production of appropriate personal level representations. We could define this 
as a S-representation! But, again, this is not ampliative. The adoption of the language of 
representation may give the impression of depth of explanation. But the definition accomplishes 
only an abbreviation.20  
5.3 The Soft Line 
This leads us from the hard line to the soft line. The hard line maintained that the states over 
which SMI are defined are genuine representations. The soft line treats talk of representations as 
a proxy for something that entails no commitment to genuine intentionality. But then why 
bother? The answer is that even if talk of representations and unconscious inferences plays no 
fundamental explanatory role, it can play a useful heuristic role. But what does it come to and 
how could it play a heuristic role?  
The answer is that, to borrow an apt expression from Brunswik (1956, p. p. 141), even if 
to different purpose,  
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if we can see processes subserving perception and cognition as ratiomorphic, we gain 
insight into how they perform a function serving personal level perception and cognition.  
 
Processes subserving perception are ratiomorphic if (i) they have the formal or functional 
features of a bit of reasoning, under an appropriate mapping, but not the semantic content, and 
(ii) the processes having that structure, in the organism’s environment, yield a largely effective 
updating of perceptual representations of its environment. This removes commitment to the 
processes involving genuine representations. But it keeps everything that is important for 
understanding. More precisely: 
 
A process is (thinly) ratiomorphic iff there is an isomorphism from its causal-functional 
structure to a system of rules and representations which shows how, from input described 
in a certain way, the system generates appropriate personal level representational output, 
where appropriateness is judged in terms of its general usefulness in guiding the 
consuming system’s cognition and action, given its goals and purposes. 
 
Why is it useful to think of subpersonal processes as ratiomorphic? There are at least four 
connected reasons.21 (i) First, it gives us a way of thinking about the causal-functional structure 
of a process in terms of a familiar conceptual scheme with which we have great facility. It 
provides, in Egan’s terms, a “function-theoretic” characterization of a mechanism subserving 
perceptual and cognitive capacities.22 (ii) Second, it is an aid to discovery because it aids in 
thinking about the perceptual system from the design perspective.  Thinking of processes as 
ratiomorphic helps us to see how the system could be structured to produce appropriately and 
dynamically changing output in response to stimuli given the environment and history of the 
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organism’s interaction with it. (iii) Third, it is an aid in making predictions because it involves 
adopting the intentional stance toward a subsystem, conceived as an oddly limited reasoner.23 
(iv) Finally, as Egan notes, it can “serve as a temporary placeholder for an incompletely 
developed computational theory of a cognitive capacity and so guide the discovery of 
mechanisms underlying the capacity” (2018, p. 13). This shows in what sense the function-
theoretic structure identified is explanatory: it quantifies over realizations that implement it, 
providing insight into what the actual realizers contribute to the functioning of the system of 
which they are a part. 
Cognition and perception are subserved by subpersonal processes. There are constraints 
on those processes given that they are supposed to deliver to the PLS, for the most part, accurate 
representations of the immediate environment. In the case of perception, this requires a causal-
functional organization of the system that generates at the output a perceptual representation 
whose intrinsic nature reflects in its structure (even if structure alone is not sufficient for 
representation) a structure of similar complexity in the world (like a map and what it maps). The 
question which needs an answer is how the structure of the one is transmitted to the other.  
When it is a design problem, we know what the target is, we know the nature of the 
environment, and we know what the input is. We can then seek to construct a mechanism that 
exploits structure in the input to transform it into the output we want, given the environment and 
a history of interaction with it. We understand how the system goes from physical input to a 
representation of the environment when we have an account of a mechanism that generates it 
from structure in the input. Since the input inevitably underdetermines the appropriate output, 
part of what we want insight into is how the system is structured to yield from input appropriate 
output. This requires something to be supplied by the mechanism that constrains the relation of 
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input to output in a way that is sensitive to what is likely to be producing the input given the 
environment. This is what makes it apt for description as ratiomorphic.  
If we think of the task as assigned to a person who has knowledge of general features of 
the environment and how the system is situated in it, and then is given knowledge of the input, 
we can think of an inferential process that would generate an appropriate output representation. 
This gives us a description of a functional-causal organization that will do the job. And if we 
implement the design in a physical system, then we will have an explanation of how that system 
does the job (assuming we have representations as output). What is crucial for understanding 
how the job is accomplished is not that there be representations and rules of inference in the 
system itself but only that its structure be isomorphic to a system of representations and rules of 
inference. Thus, thinking of the process as ratiomorphic (seeking to see it under a mapping) 
helps both (i) to formulate hypotheses about the functional-causal organization of a subsystem 
and (ii) to grasp it.  
Once we have a hypothesis about a ratiomorphic structure, (iii) it can help us to make 
predictions. For example, from Emmert’s Law we can predict that manipulating depth 
information will yield incorrect representations of object size, as is born out, for example, in the 
Ames Room Illusion. Thinking of the process as ratiomorphic makes the prediction particularly 
vivid because we think of someone deducing from incorrect premises a conclusion that follows 
from it. Conversely, thinking of illusions as generated by ratiomorphic processes provides 
additional clues to the structure of those processes. For example, the Muller-Lyer illusion, the 
Ponzo illusion (Figure 1), and the moon illusion provide clues to the functional-causal structure 
of the visual system, which we can seek to make intelligible from the design perspective, which 
encourages looking for ratiomorphic processes in the system.  
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Finally, what a hypothesis about ratiomorphic structure gives us is an account of the 
causal-functional structure of a mechanism relating input to the perceptual system (or its 
subsystems) and output, which explains, given ceteris paribus laws connecting features of the 
environment with input, why for the most part the output is appropriate for the organism. The 
causal-functional structure is a kind of mechanism sketch. The sketch is filled in by finding a 
realization of it in a lower level description of the system, and ultimately a description in terms 
of the neurophysiology of the brain. Thus, (iv) the hypothesis guides investigations into more 
detailed mechanisms underlying the functional relationship between environment, input, brain 
mechanism, and perceptual representation.  
When the ratiomorphic approach is appropriate, representational talk doesn’t add 
anything to our understanding of the nature of the process as such. Yet it does give us insight. It 
provides insight both into the causal-functional organization of the system that does the causal-
structural translation job and into how it is fitted for the job that it does. The assignments make 
perspicuous to us how the system preserves or generates or selects relevant causal-structural 
information. It makes clear to us how it subserves a function for the system we explain in terms 
of goals or representations—but crucially it does so without our having to take seriously the idea 
that the mechanisms themselves have representational content.24 In this sense the role is 
heuristic.  
6. Conclusion 
 
Serious use of the terms ‘inference’, ‘content’, ‘representation’, and ‘concept’ must pay attention 
to their application conditions or supply operational definitions. Attention to their application 
conditions makes clear that modular systems subserving personal level cognition do not engage 
in inferences, they do not involve, except in their output, representations, and they, as opposed to 
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the system which they subserve, do not possess concepts. It is natural to respond by declaring 
that philosophy should not attempt to put a priori constraints on the development of theoretical 
concepts in the pursuit of scientific understanding. But that’s not the point. If words are being 
used in their usual sense, we must respect their application conditions. If new theoretical 
concepts are being deployed, we must make clear what their nature is. When we provide 
operationalized definitions, it becomes clear that talk of inference and so on, is basically 
unrelated to the ordinary personal level notions, and supplies no explanatory power over what 
can be said without appeal to them, though the vocabulary retains a heuristic function. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 Nico Orlandi has developed a critique of inferentialist or constructivist accounts of perceptual 
accomplishment in a series of papers and a recent book (2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2013; 2014, 2016). 
Orlandi argues that inferentialism is not the best explanation of the success of the visual system. 
Orlandi advocates an embedded view (EV) of perception.  “According to EV, the visual system 
has physical features that make it act in a lawful manner. We should refrain from thinking of 
such features as representing anything. The features are biases shaped by environmental 
contingencies in the evolutionary past and in the present, and we can appeal to such 
contingencies to explain what we see” (2014, p. 57). We focus on whether the conditions for 
attributing inferences to subpersonal systems can be met in the first place, but we argue that there 
is heuristic value in inferential talk because identifies causal-functional structure that helps 
explain successful representation. We suggest that this construal of inference talk converges with 
the approach that Orlandi recommends on empirical grounds.   
2 For example, unconscious inference theories of linguistic cognition look back to Chomsky’s 
work (1965, 1988) on the structure of the language faculty. Though Chomsky has claimed that it 
is a misreading to attribute to him a UIT, his followers have embraced it: 
 
… the unconsciousness of mental grammar is still more radical than Freud’s notion of the 
unconscious: mental grammar isn’t available to consciousness under any conditions, 
therapeutic or otherwise. (Jackendoff, 1994, p. p. 9) 
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The cognitive unconscious is the massive portion of the iceberg that lies below the 
surface, below the visible tip that is consciousness. It consists of all those mental 
operations that structure and make possible all conscious experience, including the 
understanding and use of language … it is completely and irrevocably inaccessible to 
direct conscious introspection. (Lakoff & Mark, 1999, p. p. 103) 
 
UITs have been extended to unconscious processing of semantic rules for interpretation as well 
at the level of LF (see also (Larson & Segal, 1995)). On this view, language processing involves 
a faculty that possesses innate knowledge of grammatical principles and principles of 
interpretation which are applied both to input when a child is learning a first language and in 
language processing subsequently. 
3 Orlandi (2014, 2016) argues that the Bayesian approach is better characterized as an ecological 
approach than as an inferential theory.  
4 Hohwy represents the error minimization theory being a successor of inference theories that 
stretch back to Helmholtz which differs in its account of the inferences involved. Hohwy thinks 
it obvious that there is unconscious inferential processing: “We can in fact engage in such 
inference, since we can perceive” (2013, p. 14), as if perception could not occur when proximal 
stimuli underdetermine distal causes without inferential processes being involved. The 
interesting question, on his view, is the kind of inference.  
5 We don’t claim these desiderata are exhaustive, only that they are of central importance. See 
Hlobil (2014, 2016) for discussion.  
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6 Boghossian notes a historical precedent for the Taking Condition in Frege, who claims, “[t]o 
make a judgment because we are cognizant of other truths as providing a justification for it is 
known as inferring.” (1979, p. 3). See Hlobil (2016) for more on historical antecedents.  
7 Neta (2013) argues that taking is a judgement, Valaris (2014, 2017) that it is a belief, and 
Chudnuff (2014) and Dogramaci (2013) that it is an intuition or intellectual seeming. In contrast, 
Hlobil (2016) and Boghossian (2014) (and arguably Broome, 2013) deny that it is an intentional 
state.  
8 Nes (2016) claims that in inferring some proposition, p, from some set of propositions, Q, one 
has “the sense” that Q means that p where ‘means’ is taken to be natural meaning in Grice’s 
sense of the term. Broome (2013) claims that the content of taking is that the contents of one’s 
premise attitudes imply the contents of one’s conclusion attitude. Valaris (2017) argues that the 
content of taking is that the contents of one’s conclusion attitude follows from the content of 
one’s premise attitudes, where taking consists in realizing that all (relevant) possibilities that 
make one’s premise attitudes true, make one’s conclusion attitude true. Finally, Neta (2013) 
claims that the content of a taking state is that one’s premise attitudes propositionally justify 
one’s conclusion attitude. 
9 See Boghossian (2008) on epistemic rules.  
10 Modular inferences are subpersonal. It is prima facie consistent with their being unconscious 
and modular that they are inferences made by the person in whom they take place. We do not 
address this view here because (i) it is implausible and (ii) it is unlikely that those advocating for 
an unconscious inference theory of perceptual achievement attribute, e.g., the inferences 
supposedly being drawn by the visual system to the agent herself as subject. For example, many 
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of the inferences would involve concepts that the PLS (which may be a child or non-linguistic 
animal) clearly does not possess.  
11 Many theorists attribute genuine beliefs to subsystems in the brain. For example, “It asserts 
that at some level of description all creatures of the same phenotype share the same prior beliefs 
about what their sensory input should be ….” (Hohwy, 2013, p. p. 86). Here the sensory inputs 
are not conscious level but stimulus at the sensory surfaces, of which the PLS is ignorant. 
12 Could one argue that the goals are not goals of the module but of the system that contains it?  
(Thanks to Anders Nes for this question.) First, since the behavior being guided is that of the 
subsystem, the goals are directed at what the subsystem does rather than the containing system, 
and so are at the wrong level to be personal level goals.  Second, as we note next, the concepts 
deployed in the subsystem representations cannot be generally assumed to be available to the 
containing system.  These concepts will be involved in goal specification for the subsystem as 
well. 
13 Are we overlooking the possibility of non-conceptual content?  Non-conceptual content has 
been claimed for perceptual experiences, but we are not here entertaining views that attribute 
perceptual experiences to subpersonal modules.  However, subpersonal computations have also 
been said to have non-conceptual content because they traffic in representations whose 
correctness conditions would be specified using concepts the PLS does not possess (Evans, 1982, 
pp. p. 104, n 22).  However, we are here concerned with the view that SMI involve genuine 
inferences of just the sort that occur in the PLS except for being subpersonal.  (See the quotations 
in section 2 and notes 11 and 18 in this connection.)  We will consider fallback positions in 
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section 5, where we conclude that there is no case for a subsystem having states that are 
representations for the subsystem itself rather than a grid projected onto it by the theorist. 
14 We pass over some problems related to conclusions and premises of SMI. The conclusion is in 
a different subject than the premises, is an experience rather than belief, and contains more 
information than the premises. The first is the most serious problem because there is no one subject 
to take the premises to support the conclusion. For the premises, how are the general principles, 
some of which are not innate, learned by subsystems, if they do not have access to information 
possessed by the PLS, and how do subsystems learn of what is going on at the sensory surfaces? 
Magic? 
15 On this topic, it is useful to note a feature of Bayesian models of perception. The Bayesian 
inference from perceptual input to, e.g., shape, yields a probability distribution, but perception is 
determinate. This is usually handled by invoking a utility function, which may be task 
dependent, that reflects the penalty for making a mistake (rather than just choosing the 
hypothesis with the highest posterior probability). The determinate output is the one that 
maximizes expected utility. However, first, this undercuts the idea that an inference is being 
made to what the environment is like. If you accept Pascal’s Wager, you are not inferring that 
God exists, but reaching the practical judgment that belief in God maximizes expected utility. 
Second, whose utility? Not the perceptual system, but the PLS, since it is potential harm or 
benefit to the whole system that is taken into account.  But then we have an action with no proper 
agent.  
16 The prediction error minimization project treats the perceptual system as a hierarchy of levels 
at each of which inferences are performed. At the lowest level it treats inputs to the inferences as 
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involving information about physical stimulation of the sensory surfaces. “The brain does have 
access to the sensory data that impinges on it” (Hohwy 2013, p. 50). The brain is also said to 
engage not just in first-order Bayesian reasoning but in “second order statistics that optimizes its 
precision expectations,” which is a matter of “perceptual inference about perceptual inference” 
(p. 66). This involves more conceptual sophistication than most people possess. It is a good thing 
the brain is smarter than the person it serves. Notably, the more sophisticated the theorist 
becomes, the more sophisticated the brain is said to be. The history of inferential accounts, which 
have become more and more sophisticated over time, suggests that the inferences lie in the eye 
of the beholder.  
17 Dennett’s proposal was bound up with his advocacy of the Intentional Stance as foundational 
in understanding propositional attitude attributions. See note 23 in this connection. See also 
Hornsby (2000, p. sec. 4) for how Dennett’s development of intentional systems theory led him 
away from an early strict division between personal level attributions of psychological states and 
subpersonal mechanisms.  
18 See the quotation from Rock in section 2, and Fodor (1984): “… what mediates perception is 
an inference from effect to causes. The sort of mentation required for perception is thus not 
different in kind—though no doubt it differs a lot in conscious accessibility—from what goes on 
in Sherlock Holmes’s head when he infers the identity of the criminal from a stray cigar band 
and a hair or two” (p. 31). In this connection see also the discussion in (Bennett & Hacker, 2003, 
pp. 23-33). 
19 This is very much the idea in the prediction error minimization account that attributes 
Bayesian reasoning to the perceptual system. The brain has a model of the environment which is 
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used to make a prediction and revised to minimize error between the prediction and environment 
(Hohwy 2013, ch. 2). 
20 Ramsey defends S-representations against the related charge that isomorphism is promiscuous 
by arguing that “components of the model become representations when the isomorphism is 
exploited in the execution of surrogative problem-solving” (2007, p. 96). One might think this 
solves the problem just outlined. But the question is still how to make sense of its being exploited 
in any sense other than playing a causal role in producing appropriate personal level 
representations, or of problem solving going on in any sense other than that an appropriate 
personal level representation results. Repeating a question begging description is not an 
argument.  
21 See Ludwig (1996, p. sec. 7). Frances Egan’s (2010, 2012, 2013, 2017) two-part pragmatic 
deflationary account of representations in cognitive neuroscience separates mathematical from 
cognitive content in computational accounts of cognitive function. Our discussion focuses on 
what Egan calls the intentional gloss. The mathematical function gets into the picture only as 
more detailed mechanisms for realization of the “inferential processes” are proposed.  
22 Egan introduces this term (2013, 2017) to characterize a neural mechanism as computing a 
mathematical function, but it applies equally well to inferential theories at a higher level of 
functional organization.  
23 We treat the intentional stance as a matter of treating a system as-if it had intentional states. 
Dennett’s intentional systems theory holds that the distinction between as-if intentionality and 
original intentionality is ill-motivated (2009). We reject this. The concept of the intentional 
stance presupposes intentionality since it presupposes an intentional agent who takes it up. If 
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intentional systems theory maintains that a system has genuine intentional states iff someone can 
usefully take the intentional stance toward it, it makes the explanans presupposes an 
understanding of the explanandum. Thus, the truth of the biconditional itself has to be settled on 
the basis of an independent analysis of intentionality. For further critical discussion, see (Bennett 
& Hacker, 2003, p. appendix 1). 
24 Assigning representational contents to states is analogous to assigning numbers to physical 
magnitudes like mass, energy, and momentum. We use the numbers and their structure to keep 
track of relations among the states that we assign them to. Similarly, to treat a state, say, as 
representing 1, or an edge, is to keep track of its role in the system, relative to a systematic 
assignment of contents to states and semantic relations to transitions.  
